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We present a theory of European legal integration that relies on three causal factors: transnational exchange, triadic dispute resolution, and theproduction of legal norms. After stating the theory in abstract terms, we explain the construction of the legal system and test the relationship among our 
three variables over the life of the European Community. We then examine the effect of the EC legal system 
on policy outcomes at both the national and supranational levels in two policy domains: the pee movement 
of goods and gender equality. Our theory outperforms its leading rival, intergovernmentalism. The evidence 
shows that European integration has generally been driven by transnational activity and the efforts of EC 
institutions to reduce transaction costs, behavior which governments react to but do not control. 
No international organization in world history has attracted as much scholarly attention as the European Community (EC).l The reason is 
straightforward: The EC has evolved from a relatively 
traditional (albeit multifaceted) interstate system into a 
quasi-federal polity. In a word, Europe has integrated, 
as the linkages between politics on the EC level and 
politics on the national level have expanded in scope 
and deepened in intensity. Scholars working in diverse 
fields, including public law, international relations, and 
comparative politics, have been fascinated by the inte- 
gration process, not least because of the challenge of 
understanding the reciprocal effect, over time, of inter- 
national and domestic systems of governance. 
Current theoretical disagreements about how to 
understand European integration are largely disputes 
between intergovernmentalists, whose imagery is 
drawn from the international regime literature (Gar- 
rett 1992; Keohane and Hoffmann 1991; Moravcsik 
1991, 1993; Taylor 1983), and supranationalists, whose 
imagery is often federalist (Burley and Mattli 1993; 
Leibfried and Pierson, eds., 1995; Marks, Hooghe, and 
Blank 1996; Sandholtz 1993,1996; Sbragia 1993; Stone 
Sweet and Sandholtz 1997). Intergovernmentalists ac- 
cord relative priority to member state governments- 
representatives of the national interest-who bargain 
with one another in EC fora to fix the terms and limits 
of integration. Supranationalists (especially the heirs of 
neofunctionalism), accord relative priority to EC insti- 
tutions-representatives of the interests of a nascent 
transnational society-who work with public and pri- 
Alec Stone Sweet is Associate Professor and Thomas L. Brunell is a 
Ph.D. candidate, Department of Politics and Society, School of 
Social Sciences, University of California, Irvine, CA 92697-5100. 
The authors are grateful to the National Science Foundation, 
Grant No. SBR-9412531, the National Endowment for the Human- 
ities, Grant No. FA-32480-94, the European Court of Justice, and the 
Robert Schuman Centre of the European University Institute for 
their support of this research. We also wish to thank James Capo- 
raso, Lisa Conant, Russell Dalton, Harry Eckstein, Jonathon Golub, 
Bernard Grofman, Ronald Jepperson, Gary King, and Wayne Sand- 
holtz for helpful comments. 
Although "European Union" is now commonly used to denote the 
European polity, we use "European Community" throughout. For- 
mally, the EC remains distinct from the EU, and the EC is the most 
inclusive term for how the organization and its legal system function 
most of the time. 
vate actors at both the European and national levels to 
remove barriers to integration and to expand the 
domain of supranational governance. This paper is 
implicated in these disputes. One of our claims is that, 
on crucial points, the intergovernmentalists have got- 
ten it wrong. 
More important, we propose a theory of European 
legal integration, the process by which Europe has 
constructed a transnational rule-of-law polity. The 
theory integrates, as interdependent causal factors, 
contracting among individuals, third-party dispute res- 
olution, and the production of legal norms. We test the 
theory, with reference to the EC, in two stages. First, 
we explain the construction of the legal system, and 
analyze the relationships among our three key vari- 
ables over the life of the EC. Second, we examine the 
effect of the operation of the legal system on gover- 
nance, that is, on policy processes and outcomes, at 
both the national and supranational levels. 
CONTRACTING, DISPUTE RESOLUTION, 
AND LAWMAKING 
Our theory relies on three analytically independent 
factors that we expect to be interdependent in their 
effect. Because we believe the theory has general 
application (it helps us understand how all rule-of-law 
governmental systems may emerge and develop), we 
present it in an abstract form here. It has been elabo- 
rated more formally elsewhere (Stone Sweet n.d.) 
The first factor is a simple contract-an exchange 
relationship-between two persons. Contracts, which 
are codified promises, fix the rules for a given exchange 
by establishing the rights and obligations of each 
contracting party with respect to the other. The con- 
tract is an inherently social institution, embedded in a 
cultural (or normative) framework that enables indi- 
viduals not only to conceive, pursue, and express their 
interests and desires but also to coordinate them with 
those of others. Furthermore, to get to the very notion 
of a codified promise we must have language, notions 
of individual roles, commitment, reputation, and re- 
sponsibility (which have no meaning outside a social 
setting) as well as some set of collective expectations 
about the future. As exchange proceeds over the life of 
the contract, or as external circumstances change, the 
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meanings attached to the same set of rules by the 
contractants may diverge. To the extent that such 
conflicts arise, contracting generates a social demand 
for third-party dispute resolution, for law and courts, 
the function of which is to sustain social exchange over 
time. 
The second factor, then, is effective triadic dispute 
resolution. Without it, the costs of exchange may be 
prohibitive, since each prospective party may doubt 
that the other will abide by promises made over the life 
of the contract. A judicial system lowers these costs, 
providing a measure of certainty to each contractant 
and a means of reconsecrating the terms of the con- 
tract over time, given the certainty that differences in 
interpretation will arise as unforeseen circumstances 
arise. Transaction costs are particularly high in situa- 
tions in which strangers-those who do not share a 
common normative framework (whether cultural or 
legal)-contemplate exchange and no effective triadic 
dispute resolution exists. 
The triad-two disputants and a dispute resolver- 
constitutes a basic, probably primal, institution of 
governance (Simmel 1950, 145-69). In every human 
community about which we know anything, we find 
such triads, arrayed along 2 spectrum that stretches 
roughly from consent-based mediation to arbitration to 
coercive-adjudication. Commonly, triadic dispute res- 
olution performs profoundly political functions, includ- 
ing the construction, consolidation, and maintenance 
of political regimes (Shapiro 1980, chapter I), func- 
tions that inhere in the lawmaking dynamics of dispute 
resolution itself. 
Consider formal adjudication, wherein judges are 
required, for legitimacy purposes among others, to 
provide legal reasons to support their decisions. When 
a judge decides, the lawmaking effect of the decision is 
always twofold. First, in settling the dispute at hand, 
the judge produces a legal act that is particular (it binds 
the two disputants) and retrospective (it resolves an 
existing dispute). Second, in justifying the decision, the 
judge signals that she will settle similar cases similarly 
in the future; this legal act is a general and prospective 
one (it affects future and potential contractants). Thus, 
judges do not simply or only respond to demands 
generated by social exchange. Rather, they adapt, 
continuously, the abstract legal rules governing ex- 
change in any given community to the concrete exigen- 
cies of those individuals engaged in exchange. 
The third factor is legislating, the elaboration of 
legal rules. Rules facilitate and also structure exchange 
by restricting some practices while permitting others. 
Conceived in this way, the legislator serves a social 
function rather similar to that of the judge: both 
produce rules that serve to reduce the transaction 
costs, enhance the legal certainty, and stabilize the 
expectations of those engaged in or contemplating 
exchange. Legislating, of course, is a far more efficient 
means of coordinating activity than is case-by-case 
adjudication and rule making. But because legal norms 
are so efficacious (immediately binding on broad 
classes of people and activities), their production poses 
a collective action problem. Partly for this reason, and 
partly due to the dynamics of judicial rule making, 
judges may legislate on matters before legislators do. 
In any case, in polities that possess both a permanently 
constituted legislature and an independent judiciary, 
lawmaking powers are shared, and boundaries alleg- 
edly separating institutional functions blur. Thus, leg- 
islatures rely on the legal system to enforce its law; and 
the judiciary possesses broad capacity to generate legal 
rules where none existed prior to a given dispute as 
well as to reconstruct legislative norms in interstitial 
processes of interpretation. 
Viewed in dynamic relation to one another, contract- 
ing, triadic dispute resolution, and legislating can 
evolve interdependently and, in so doing, constitute 
and reconstitute a polity. Thus, as the number of 
contracts rise, the legal system will increasingly be 
activated. To the extent that the legal system performs 
its dispute-resolution functions effectively, it reduces 
contracting costs, thus encouraging more exchange. As 
the scope of legislation widens and deepens, the con- 
ditions favoring the expansion of exchange are con- 
structed, the potential for legal disputes increases, and 
the grounds available for judicial lawmaking expand. 
New collective action problems are posed as older 
barriers to exchange are removed, and these problems 
push for normative solutions. 
Components of the virtuous circle just described 
have been identified empirically and theorized by 
scholars working in diverse fields. North (1981, 1990) 
argues that differential rates of national economic 
development are in large part explained by the relative 
effectiveness of legal systems to reduce the costs of 
exchange among strangers. Although they did not focus 
on law and courts, Haas (1958, 1961) and Deutsch 
(1957) understood, somewhat differently, that sover- 
eign states will respond to increasing levels of transna- 
tional interaction by integrating politically, that is, by 
creating common institutional and normative frame- 
works that in effect give birth to new systems of 
transnational governance. Haas used the term "spill- 
over" to capture the expansive logic of integration. In 
their studies of the birth and subsequent development 
of legal systems, Kommers (1994), Landfried (1984, 
1992), Stone (1992, 1994b), and Burley and Mattli 
(1993) show that tight linkages can develop between 
self-interested litigants and judges; these interactions 
generate a self-sustaining dynamic, which by feeding 
back into the greater political environment can recon- 
figure the inner workings of the polity itself. These 
sorts of "policy feedbacks," and their political conse- 
quences, are also familiar to historical institutionalists, 
who give them pride of place (Pierson 1993; Steinmo, 
Thelen, and Longstreth 1992). 
In the rest of this paper, we examine the develop- 
ment of the European polity, focusing on the construc- 
tion and operation of the legal system. 
CONSTRUCTING THE SUPRANATIONAL 
POLITY 
The emergence of a transnational rule-of-law govern- 
mental system cannot be presumed. Our theory sug- 
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gests that transnational exchange is a critical catalyst 
for such an event, generating a social demand for 
dispute resolution (transnational triadic dispute reso- 
lution), revealing important collective action problems 
that beg for normative solutions (transnational rules), 
and thereby pushing for modes of supranational gov- 
ernance. The theory further suggests that once the 
causal connections among exchange, triadic dispute 
resolution, and rules are forged, the legal system will 
operate according to a self-sustaining and expansionary 
dynamic. But the development of causal linkages 
among our three variables implies the existence of, 
respectively, some measure of individual property 
rights, some form of adjudication, and a lawgiver. For 
well-known reasons (e.g., Waltz 1979), these conditions 
have been notoriously difficult to achieve and sustain in 
the interstate system. 
In Europe, the six states that signed the Treaty of 
Rome in 1958, establishing the European Economic 
Community, were able to overcome some of these 
difficulties but only partly. The treaty contained impor- 
tant restrictions on state sovereignty, such as the 
prohibition, within the territory constituted by the EC, 
of tariffs, quantitative restrictions, and national mea- 
sures "having equivalent effect" on trade after Decem- 
ber 31,1969. It enabled the pooling of state sovereignty 
by establishing legislative institutions and a process for 
elaborating common European policies. And it estab- 
lished "supranational" institutions, including the Euro- 
pean Commission and the European Court of Justice, 
to help the Council of Ministers (the EC institution 
that is controlled by national executives) legislate and 
resolve disputes about the meaning of EC law. Despite 
these and other important innovations, the member 
states founded an international organization, not a 
transnational rule-of-law polity. Some treaty provisions 
announced principles that, if implemented, would di- 
rectly affect individuals (e.g., free movement of work- 
ers, equal pay for equal work between the sexes), but 
the treaty did not confer on individuals judicially 
enforceable rights. 
Even within a European free trade zone we would 
expect the transaction costs facing transnational ex-
change to be higher than costs faced by those who 
contract within a single national jurisdiction, other 
things equal, to the extent that at the supranational 
level there exists no secure common legal framework 
comparable in its efficacy to that furnished by national 
legal systems. In the absence of such a framework, 
those who exchange cross-nationally would face a 
kaleidoscope of idiosyncratic national rules and prac- 
tices that would act as hindrances. The establishment 
of an effective European system of dispute resolution 
as a means of overcoming national barriers to exchange 
is therefore a crucial first step. 
In the next section, we briefly examine the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) "constitutional" case law. These 
judgments recast the normative foundations of the EC, 
radically upgrading the capacity of the legal system to 
respond to the demands of transnational society. It 
bears emphasis that this case law constitutes a neces- 
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sary condition underlying all the causal models tested 
in this paper. 
The Constitutionalization of the Treaty 
System 
The constitutionalization of the treaty system refers to 
the process by which the EC treaties have evolved from 
a set of legal arrangements binding upon sovereign 
states into a vertically integrated legal regime confer- 
ring judicially enforceable rights and obligations on all 
legal persons and entities, public and private, within 
EC territory. The phrase thus captures the transforma- 
tion of an intergovernmental organization governed by 
international law into a multi-tiered system of gover- 
nance founded on higher law constitutionalism. Today, 
legal scholars and judges conceptualize the EC as a 
constitutional polity, and this is the orthodox position 
(Lenaerts 1990; Mancini 1991; Shapiro 1992; Weiler 
1981, 1991); international relations scholars are more 
reticent to do so for reasons internal to the develop- 
ment of international relations theory (Stone 1994a). 
In its decisions, the ECJ has implicitly treated its terms 
of reference as a constitutional text since the 1960s and 
today explicitly refers to the treaties as a "constitution- 
al charter" or as "the constitution of the Community" 
(Fernandez Esteban 1994). 
The ECJ, the "constitutional court" of the EC 
(Shapiro and Stone 1994, Weiler 1994), is the supreme 
interpreter of this constitution. The court's function is 
to enforce compliance with EC law. Although the 
outcome was not anticipated, the greater bulk of the 
court's case load is generated by preliminary references 
from national judges responding to claims made by 
private actors. The preliminary reference procedure is 
governed by Article 177 of the Rome Treaty. Accord- 
ing to that article, when EC law is material to the 
resolution of a dispute being heard in a national court, 
the presiding judge may-and in some cases must-ask 
the ECJ for a correct interpretation of that law. This 
interpretation, called a preliminary ruling, shall then be 
applied by the national judge when settling the case. 
Article 177 was designed to promote the consistent 
application of EC law throughout EC territory. The 
member states did not mean to provide a mechanism 
by which individual litigants could sue their own gov- 
ernment, or to confer on national judges the power of 
judicial review of national legislation. Both of these 
outcomes, however, inhere in the ECJ's vision of the 
community as a constitutional polity. 
The constitutionalization process has been driven 
almost entirely by the relationship among private liti- 
gants, national judges, and the ECJ interacting within 
the framework provided by Article 177 (see Burley and 
Mattli 1993). The process has proceeded in two phases. 
In the 1962-79 period, the court secured the core 
constitutional principles of supremacy and direct effect. 
The ECJ made these moves without the express autho- 
rization of treaty law and despite the declared opposi- 
tion of member states (Stein 1981). The doctrine of 
supremacy, announced in Costa (ECJ 1964), lays down 
the rule that in any conflict between an EC legal rule 
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and a rule of national law, the former must be given 
primacy. Indeed, according to the court, every EC rule, 
from the moment of entry into force, "renders auto- 
matically inapplicable any conflicting provision of . . . 
national law" (Simmenthal, ECJ 1978). The doctrine of 
direct effect holds that provisions of EC law can confer 
on individuals legal rights that public authorities must 
respect and that may be protected by national courts. 
During this period, the ECJ found that certain treaty 
provisions (Van Gend en Loos, ECJ 1963) and a class of 
secondary legislation, called "directives" (Van Duyn, 
ECJ 1974a), were directly effective. The "regulation," 
the other major type of secondary legislation, is the 
only class of Euro-rule that was meant (according to 
the Treaty of Rome) to be directly applicable in 
national law. 
These moves integrated national and supranational 
legal systems, establishing a decentralized enforcement 
mechanism for EC law. The mechanism relies on the 
initiative of private actors. The doctrine of direct effect 
empowers individuals and companies to sue national 
governments or other public authorities for not con- 
forming to obligations contained in the treaties or 
regulations or for not properly transposing provisions 
of directives into national law. The doctrine of suprem- 
acy not only prohibits public authorities from relying 
on national law to justify their failure to comply with 
EC law but also requires national judges to resolve 
conflicts between national and EC law in favor of the 
latter. 
In a second wave of constitutionalization, the ECJ 
supplied national courts with enhanced means of guar- 
anteeing the effectiveness of EC law. In Von Colson 
(ECJ 1984), the doctrine of indirect effect was estab- 
lished, according to which national judges must inter- 
pret national law in conformity with EC law. In Mar- 
leasing (ECJ 1990a), the court clarified the meaning of 
indirect effect, ruling that when a directive either has 
not been transposed or has been transposed incorrectly 
into national law, national judges are obliged to inter- 
pret national law as if it were in conformity with 
European law. The doctrine thus empowers national 
judges to rewrite national legislation-in processes of 
"principled construction"-in order to render EC law 
applicable in the absence of implementing measures. 
Once national law has been so (re)constructed, EC law, 
in the guise of a de facto national rule, can be applied 
in legal disputes between private legal persons (i.e., 
nongovernmental entities). Finally, in Francovich (ECJ 
1991a), the ECJ declared the doctrine of governmental 
liability. According to this rule, a national court can 
hold a member state liable for damages caused to 
individuals due to the state's failure to implement a 
directive properly. The national court may then require 
the state to compensate such individuals for their 
financial losses. 
In this case law, the ECJ has imagined a particular 
type of relationship between the European and na- 
tional courts: a working partnership in the construction 
of a constitutional rule-of-law European Community. 
In that partnership, national judges become agents of 
the community order-they become community judg- 
es-whenever they resolve disputes governed by EC 
law. The ECJ obliges national judges to uphold the 
supremacy of EC law, even against conflicting subse- 
quent national law; encourages them to make refer- 
ences concerning the proper interpretation of EC law 
to the ECJ; and empowers them (even without a 
referral) to interpret national rules so that these will 
conform to EC law and to refuse to apply national rules 
when they do not. 
The effectiveness of the EC legal system thus de- 
pends critically on the willingness of national judges to 
refer disputes about EC law to the ECJ and to settle 
those disputes in conformity with the court's case law. 
Although national judges embraced the logic of su-
premacy with differing degrees of enthusiasm, by the 
end of the 1980s every national supreme court had 
formally accepted the doctrine (Stone Sweet 1997a). 
National judges, persuaded by compelling legal argu- 
ments in support of supremacy, empowered themselves 
by, among other things, appropriating the power of 
judicial review of national legislation (Burley and Mat- 
tli 1993; Weiler 1991, 1994). The ease with which they 
were able to accommodate supremacy contrasts with 
the slower and more conflictual consolidation of the 
U.S. federal system (Goldstein 1994).2 
Figure 1plots the annual rate of Article 177 refer- 
ences, beginning with the first reference in 1961. It also 
temporally locates the leading constitutional decisions 
discussed here. The growth in the number of refer- 
ences is steady and dramatic. Without the doctrines of 
supremacy and direct effect, the level of preliminary 
references doubtlessly would have remained stable and 
low. In proclaiming supremacy and direct effect, the 
ECJ broadcast the message that EC law could be used 
by individuals, businesses, and interest groups to obtain 
policy outcomes that might otherwise be impossible, or 
more costly, to obtain by way of national policy pro- 
cesses. It is evident from the graph that litigants and 
national judges heard this message and responded. 
Finally, it cannot be stressed enough that the EC 
legal system was constructed without the explicit con- 
sent of the member states. They possessed the means 
to reverse constitutionalization, but only by revising the 
EC's constitution. Treaty revision requires the unani- 
mous vote of all members, acting as a constituent 
assembly, followed by national ratification (according 
to diverse procedures, including referenda). Given this 
decision-making rule, it is not surprising that the 
member states have never overturned an ECJ interpre- 
tation of the treaties. 
Data Analysis 
Our theory yields a set of testable propositions. First, 
transnational exchange generates social demands for 
transnational triadic dispute resolution. Specifically, 
higher levels of cross-national activity will produce 
In the nineteenth century, transformations in the common law, 
rather than in constitutional law, were fundamental to American 
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FIGURE 1. Annual Number of Article 177 
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more conflicts between national and EC law and 
therefore more Article 177 references. Second, higher 
levels of transnational activity will push for suprana- 
tional rules (judicial or legislative) to replace national 
rules. Third, to the extent that European judicial and 
legislative institutions function with minimal effective- 
ness, European integration-as evidenced by the rising 
tide of the ECJ's case law and of EC legislation-will 
feed back into society. The consolidation and expan- 
sion of European governance will fuel more transna- 
tional activity and provide the normative context for 
more Article 177 references in an increasing number 
of domains. Fourth, to the extent that the above 
propositions hold, transnational activity, transnational 
judicial activity, and the production of European leg- 
islation will develop interdependently, and this inter- 
dependence will drive European integration in predict- 
able ways. That is, once the causal linkages among 
these three factors have been constructed, a dynamic, 
self-reinforcing process will push for the progressive 
expansion of supranational governance. These propo- 
sitions, of course, depend critically on the prior an- 
nouncement by the ECJ of supremacy and direct effect. 
We tested our theory with data collected in 1995 at 
the ECJ in Luxembourg. With the help of the court, we 
gathered information on Article 177 reference activity 
from 1961 to mid-1995 for a total of 2,978 references. 
We then coded each by country of origin, year of 
referral, the national court making the reference, and 
the subject matter of the dispute, among other things. 
These data had never been compiled. We also com- 
piled data on transnational exchange and the produc- 
tion of European legal rules; for the former, we make 
heavy use of data on intra-EC trade, because it is the 
only reasonable indicator of transnational exchange for 
which we have reliable information reported annually, 
partner-by-partner, over the life of the EC.3 
We are not arguing that intra-EC trade, one type of transnational 
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We have argued that transnational exchange is fun- 
damental to the construction of a transnational legal 
system. To begin testing the proposition, we con-
fronted one of the deepest mysteries of European legal 
integration: What accounts for the wide cross-national 
variance in the number of Article 177 references? The 
scholarly literature on the problem has produced a 
handful of reasonable candidate explanations, includ- 
ing the role of legal culture, the bureaucratic organi- 
zation of the courts, the extent of constitutional mo- 
nism or dualism, and the length of a judiciary's 
experience with judicial review. Two recent studies, 
one by Dehousse (1996) and the other a collaborative 
project focused on the reception of supremacy by the 
national courts (Slaughter, Stone, and Weiler 1997), 
assessed these and other factors in comparative per- 
spective. Both studies generally conclude that variance 
in the intensity of the ECJ-national court relationship 
is overdetermined and/or explained by factors operat- 
ing with different effects across national borders.4 
Our theory provides an alternative explanation, one 
based on cross-national activity. Figure 2 depicts the 
correlation of the average level of intra-EC trade over 
1961-92 on the average number of Article 177 refer- 
ences per year from the national courts of each of the 
twelve member states.5 We averaged the number of 
references annually in order to correct for the fact that 
some states joined the EC later than others, and we 
have combined reference data for Belgium and Lux- 
embourg because the trade data for those states are 
combined by Eurostat reporting services. The linear 
relationship between intra-EC trade and references is 
nearly perfect (adj. R' = .92), with countries that trade 
more with their partners in the EC generating higher 
levels of Article 177 references. The results broadly 
support our theoretical claims. We also examined the 
effect on references of other plausible and quantifiable 
independent variables, including cross-national mea- 
surements of "diffuse popular support" for the EC 
legal system, population, and GDP, but none came 
activity, subsumes other important forms of exchange, such as labor 
and capital flows, and the formation of EC interest groups and social 
movements. Unfortunately, data on these and other forms of ex-
change are incomplete and often unreliable. We would expect that 
increasing transnational activity of a particular type, within a given 
domain, will drive integration processes in that area (e.g., patterns in 
cross-national flows of workers will drive litigation in social security). 
Generally, we had good reason to expect that trade would dominate 
the construction of Europe since, for most of the life of the EC, the 
core of the European integration project has been the creation of a 
common market for goods and agriculture. For further discussion of 
this point, see tables 3 and 4. 
There is little point in formally testing these explanations. We know 
by simply looking at the raw data on references comparatively that 
alleged relationships do not hold between the factors cited above and 
national levels of Article 177 references (e.g., the more monist the 
constitutional order, the more references generated). If these factors 
do affect levels of Article 177 references, they must operate with 
different effects across the EC. 
5 In 1995, the Eurostat reporting service furnished annual intra-EC 
trade figures for 1958-92. Because the service has not yet updated 
these figures, and because subsequent data are reported on different 
scales, we have not used data after 1992 in any of the regression 
models reported here. 
Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European Community 	 March 1998 
FIGURE 2. Intra-EC Trade and Average Number of Article 177 References 
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close to performing as well as intra-EC trade. See 
Appendix B. 
Figure 2 depicts the relationship between intra-EC 
trade and Article 177 references cross-nationally, with 
no time element. Figure 3 depicts the relationship 
between the same two variables over time, since 1961, 
with no cross-national element. In this model, we 
include a dummy variable to account for (1) the 
constitutionalization of the treaties and (2) the prohi- 
bition of national restrictions on intra-EC trade (Arti- 
cle 30, EEC) that took effect on January 1,1970. As we 
have seen, the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect 
made it possible for individuals to have their rights 
under EC law protected before their own national 
courts; and, as of 1970, Article 30-which proclaims 
the free movement of goods-provided the legal basis 
for traders to claim those rights (Poiares Maduro 
1997).6 We coded the dummy variable 0 from 1961-69 
and 1 from 1970-92 (hereafter the "post-1969 dum- 
my"). 
Figure 3 plots the actual and predicted annual levels 
of Article 177 references for the EC as a whole. The 
predicted level-generated by a regression analysis in 
which the dependent variable is the yearly number of 
In addition (pursuant to Article 33, EEC), in 1970 the European 
Commission produced a directive clarifying the meaning of the 
principle of free movement of goods and the lawful exceptions to it. 
Article 177 references and the independent variables 
are annual intra-EC trade and the post-1969 dummy- 
plots the references predicted by the independent 
variables. The adjusted R' = .91, and the coefficients 
for both intra-EC trade and the dummy variable are 
positive and statistically significant. 
Our time-series data for intra-EC trade and Article 
177 references are nonstationary (the augmented Dick- 
ey-Fuller test), a common problem for data containing 
a strong trend. We argue that our results are neverthe- 
less valid for two reasons. First, the data on intra-EC 
trade and Article 177 references are cointegrated, 
indicating that a linear combination of the two vari- 
ables is stationary.7 Second, we checked for serial 
autocorrelation in the error terms and found none.8 
We would be more confident in our results if we had 
more observations. By using our time series and our 
cross-national data together, we were able to increase 
the number of observations and provide a more strin- 
gent test of the effect of transnational exchange on 
judicial activity. Table 1 presents the results of two 
pooled models. The first examines the effect of in- 
7 Using the Johansen cointegration test, we reject the hypothesis of 
no cointegration between these two variables at the .O1 level. 
Using Econometric Views 2.0, we examined the correlogram. All 
the autocorrelations of the residuals, with the exception of one (at 
t - 8), were within plus or minus two standard errors of zero. 
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FIGURE 3. Actual and Predicted Annual Levels of Article 177 References from Intra-EC Trade 
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Source: Trade data are from Eurostat (1995). The source for Article 177 references is data collected by the authors and the ECJ. 
Note: The actual line plots the yearly number of Article 177 references by national courts to the ECJ, 1961-92. The predicted line plots the number of 
annual references predicted by the regression analysis in which intra-EC trade and a post-1969 dummy variable (coded 0 from 1961-69 and 1 from 
1970-92) are the independent variables, and the dependent variable is the annual number of Article 177 references for the EC as a whole. Levels of 
aggregate trade begin with the original six member states (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands); as new member states 
join the EC, their trade figures are included. The regression equation is y = 3.56 + .0000938(intra-EC Trade) + 39.93(post-1969 dummy) + e. The adjusted 
R2 = .91, n = 32, SEE = 17.92, and the Durbin-Watson statistic for the regression equation = 1.85. The t-statistics are 0.59 for the constant, 10.59 for 
intra-EC trade, and 4.52 for the post-1969 dummy. 
TABLE 1. The Effect of Intra-EC Trade on 
Article 177 References: Pooled, Cross- 
sectional, Time-Series Models 
Model 1 Model 2 
Intra-EC Trade .000126*** .0000995*** 
(18.89) (1 3.29) 
Post-1 969 Dummy 7.64*** 
(6.25) 
Adjusted R2 .73 .77 
SEE 6.19 5.74 
N 246 246 
Source: The source for the trade data is Eurostat (1995). The source for 
Article 177 references is data collected by the authors and the ECJ. 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients, with t-statis- 
tics reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is annual Article 
177 references for each member state, per year. The independent 
variable for model 1 is intra-EC trade, the value of both imports and 
exports for each member state (Belgium and Luxembourg combined) 
with all other member states, for each year. The independent variables 
for model 2 are intra-EC trade and a dummy variable coded 0 from 
1961-69 and 1 from 1970-92. The model consists of 246 observations: 
Belgium-Luxembourg 1961-92; Denmark 1973-92; France 1961-92; 
Germany 1961-92; Greece 1981-92; Ireland 1973-92; Italy 1961-92; 
Netherlands 1961-92; Portugal 1986-92; Spain 1986-92; and United 
Kingdom 1973-92. Econometric Views 2.0 was used to estimate a fixed 
effects model. See Stimson (1985) and Sayrs (1989) for a discussion of 
pooled models. 
"*p < .001. 
tra-EC trade on Article 177 references, cross-nation- 
ally and over time; the second examines this same 
relationship but with the post-1969 dummy included as 
a second independent variable. The trade variable in 
both models is positive and highly statistically signifi- 
cant. Following the advice of Stimson (1985) and King 
(1986), after estimating the models, we ensured that no 
serial autocorrelation of the errors exi~ted.~  
Thus, we find strong support for our claim that 
transnational exchange has been a crucial factor driv- 
ing the construction of the EC's legal system.1° Fur- 
thermore, our analysis does not conflict with-indeed, 
it builds on-the basic narrative told by legal scholars 
of how the ECJ constitutionalized the treaties. 
Using Econometric Views 2.0, we examined the correlograms for 
each panel. All the autocorrelations of the residuals were within plus 
or minus two standard errors of zero, and no significant patterns 
were found. 
10 We expect that as the European polity matures, the litigation of 
EC legal disputes will increase. We do not expect that Article 177 
references will continue to rise indefinitely. The capacity of the ECJ 
to process references is limited. We predict that national judges 
themselves will increasingly resolve EC legal disputes on their own, 
without a prior reference. For a discussion of the problem of Article 
177 and the overloaded docket of the ECJ. see Weiler 1987. 
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FIGURE 4. Actual and Predicted Annual Levels of Article 177 References from Intra-EC Trade 
and Euro-rules 
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Source: Trade data are from Eurostat (1 995). Euro-rules are the annual number of directives and regulations promulgated by the EC. The source for Article 
177 references is data collected by the authors and the ECJ. 
Note: The actual line plots the yearly number of Article 177 references by national courts to the ECJ, 1961-92. The predicted line plots the number of 
annual references predicted by the regression analysis in which intra-EC trade, Euro-rules, and a post-1969 dummy variable (coded 0 from 1961-69 and 
1 from 1970-92) are the independent variables, and the annual number of Article 177 references for the EC as a whole is the dependent variable. Levels 
of aggregate trade begin with the original six member states (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands); as new member states 
join the EC, their trade figures are included. The regression equation is y = 2.84 + .0000731(intra-EC Trade) + 2.04(Euro-rules) + 31.35(post-1969 
dummy) + e. The adjusted R2= .92, n = 32, SEE = 17.01, and the Durbin-Watson for the regression equation = 2.18. The t-statistics are .50 for the 
constant, 5.55 for intra-EC Trade, 2.04 for Euro-rules, and 3.34 for the post-1969 dummy. 
We have also argued that the emergence of effective 
transnational triadic dispute resolution is seminal to 
the emergence of supranational governance. Our the- 
ory suggests that the operation of the legal system will 
produce powerful feedback effects, the most important 
of which are normative (rule based). One crucial 
function of triadic dispute resolution is to produce 
stable, normative solutions to collective action prob- 
lems. In principle, a governmental system can be 
constituted entirely by judicial rule making: The dis- 
pute resolver governs by the pedagogical authority of 
its decisions. In practice, courts share governmental 
authority with legislative bodies, not least because 
legislating is a more efficient way to produce legal rules 
than is adjudicating. Once a transnational legal system 
has been consolidated, the production of European 
legal rules-whether by judicial or legislative process- 
es-will facilitate the expansion of transnational ex-
change. 
To evaluate the interrelationships that may have 
developed among our three variables, we collected 
data on the annual production of the two general 
categories of EC legislation: regulations and directives 
(hereafter called Euro-rules). Both types of legislation 
are drafted and proposed by the European Commis- 
sion, a supranational body that blends legislative and 
administrative functions (Ludlow 1991). Simplifying a 
complicated process, these proposals can be amended 
in interactions involving the European Parliament, the 
commission, and the Council of Ministers (Tsebelis 
1994). Euro-rules are finally adopted by the council, a 
body composed of ministers from member govern- 
ments, the exact composition of which is determined by 
the subject matter of EC law under discussion (Wessels 
1991). 
Figure 4 plots the actual and predicted annual levels 
of Article 177 references for the EC as a whole. The 
predicted line (generated by a regression analysis in 
which the dependent variable is the yearly number of 
Article 177 references and the independent variables 
are annual intra-EC trade, the annual number of 
Euro-rules promulgated, and the post-1969 dummy) 
plots the level of references predicted by the indepen- 
dent variables. The adjusted R~ = .92, and the coeffi- 
cients for all three variables are positive and significant, 
as expected.11 
l1 Using the Johansen cointegration test, we rejected the hypothesis 
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Note: The Article 177 references are the yearly number for the EC as a whole, 1961-92. The Euro-rules are the annual number of directives and regulations 
promulgated by the EC. The intra-EC trade line plots levels of aggregate intra-EC trade for the EC as a whole. The graph has been rescaled since the 
variables are on different scales. 
Figure 5 depicts the growth of transnational ex-
change (in the form of intra-EC trade), the evolution of 
transnational judicial activity (in the form of Article 
177 references), and the development of transnational 
legal norms (in the form of Euro-rules). It thus shows 
the development of the European polity. The high 
intercorrelation among the three variables is another 
way of describing the virtuous circle at the core of our 
theory. 
Do European integration processes serve to expand 
transnational activity? To answer that question, we 
compared annual rates of growth in trade over the life 
of the EC among (1) EC states with one another and 
(2) non-EC states with EC members. In order to 
maximize comparability, we focused on two groupings: 
the original six members and the three states (Den- 
of no cointegration among these three variables at less than the .05 
level. To test further the existence of a cointegrating relation, we 
undertook two separate tests (see Johnston and DiNardo 1997, 
266-70). First, using the augmented Dickey-Fuller test, we checked 
to ensure that the residuals from the regression analysis were 
stationary. We were able to reject the hypothesis of nonstationarity at 
the .O1 level. Second, we fitted a general autoregressive distributive 
lag (ADL) specification to these variables. This entails using lagged 
values of the three variables on the right-hand side of the OLS 
equation. We then conducted F-tests on the sums of the coefficients 
for current and lagged values for each variable (results omitted). 
Results show that the sums of the coefficients for both the Article 177 
references and intra-EC trade variables differ significantly from zero 
at the .O1 level. The p-value for the sum of the coefficients for the 
Euro-rules variable was .076, which approaches statistical signifi- 
cance. Taken together, these tests provide further support for our 
claim that these three variables have come to develop interdepen- 
dently. 
mark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom) that joined in 
1973. As the numbers in Table 2 show, before 1973, the 
growth in trade was far higher among EC members 
than between EC states and the three nonmembers. 
Once these latter joined the EC, their growth rates rose 
above levels achieved by the original six. Although 
trade is a crucial measure of the degree of integration 
among EC members, its relative importance in activat- 
TABLE 2. Average Growth Rates in Trade 

between Individual States and All EC 

Members, by Period, in Percentage 

Percentage 
1961 -72 1973-92 Change 

Belux 11.8% 9.4% -20.1 % 

France 13.5 9.2 -31.7 

Germany 12.1 10.4 -14.3 

Italy 13.3 10.8 -18.2 

Netherlands 11.3 9.4 -16.9 

Average 12.4 9.8 -20.2 
Denmark 6.0 9.9 +65.0 

Ireland 9.3 11.4 +22.1 

United Kingdom 8.8 11.3 +28.0 

Average 8.0 10.9 +38.4 

Source: Eumstat (1 995). 
Note: Entries under the 1961-72 and 1973-92 columns are the average 
rate of growth in trade between each member state listed with all 
members of the EC. Entries under the third column are the change 
registered, between the two periods, in the growth rates in trade 
between each state listed with all members of the EC. Belux combines 
Belgium and Luxembourg. Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom 
entered the EC in January 1973. 
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TABLE 3. Distribution of Legal Claims by Subject Matter, Article 177 References 
Subject Matter 
Agriculture 









Free movement of workers 
Environment 
Commercial policy and dumping 
Total claims 
1961 -70 1971 -75 1976-80 1981 -85 1986-90 1991 -95 

























































































































































Percentage of total claims by period 3.8 9.1 18.2 19.6 21.2 28.1 
Source: Data compiled by the authors with the help of ECJ. 
Note: The table lists only the thirteen most important legal domains, which together comprise more than 80% of the 3,855 total claims. We coded 
references by subject matter and relevant provision of the EEC Treaty. Each of the legal subject matters listed in the first column corresponds to the 
articles of the EEC Treaty following in parentheses: agriculture (38-47); free movement of goods (9-37); social security (51); taxes (95-9); competition 
(85-94); approximation of laws (100-2); transportation (74-84); establishment (52-66); social provisions (117-22); external free movement of workers 
(48-50); environment (130R-1); and commercial policy and dumping (110-6). Although most references are limited to a single subject matter of EC law, 
some references contain claims based on as many as five subject matters. This accounts for the difference between the total number of references and 
the total number of subject matters invoked in references. 
7 h e  freedom to establish undertakings and to provide services. 
bA miscellaneous category including all EC economic policies affecting the European Free Trade Area, the GAT,  food aid, and special agreements with 
non-EC states. 
ing the legal system also must be evaluated in terms of 
changes in the density and scope of Euro-rules. 
The theory, after all, posits an expansive logic to 
integration processes. According to this logic, the 
growing interdependence of transnational exchange, 
judicial activity, and Euro-rules drives the progressive 
construction of the supranational polity. By that we 
mean the process by which governmental competences, 
in an increasing number of domains, are transferred 
from the national to the supranational level. Simply 
put, as triadic dispute resolution and other processes 
remove the most obvious hindrances to transnational 
exchange (border inspections, fees and duties, and so 
on), and as supranational coordinative rules replace 
the disparate rules in place in the member states, new 
obstacles to integration are revealed and become sa- 
lient (such as regulations protecting consumers and the 
environment). These national rules and practices will 
be targeted by litigants, and pressure will be exerted on 
EC legislative institutions to widen the jurisdiction of 
EC governance into new domains. We think of this 
dynamic as a kind of legal "spillover." 
Our data provide some preliminary support for our 
contention. First, we examined the evolution of the 
substantive content of Article 177 references. Recall 
that these claims constitute allegations, by private 
litigants, that rules or practices in place in an individual 
country conflict with Euro-rules. Litigants have there- 
fore requested national judges to enforce EC law by, in 
effect, eliminating conflicting national rules or prac- 
tices. Table 3 charts this evolution, vividly recording 
the extent to which the domain of EC law has ex- 
panded. The percentage of claims involving the direct 
exchange of goods-the free movement of goods and 
agriculture-has steadily declined, dropping from 
more than 50% in 1971-75 to 27% in 1991-95. At the 
same time, more indirect hindrances to trade, such as 
national rules governing equal pay for equal work 
(social provisions), environmental protection, and tax- 
ation policy, have become important sites of contesta- 
tion. 
Second, we assessed the relationship between trade 
and Article 177 references over time by including a 
variable to capture the interaction of intra-EC trade 
and time. Table 4 presents the results of this model. 
Our expectation about the interaction variable was that 
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TABLE 4. The Declining Effect of Intra-EC 
Trade on Article 177 References: Pooled, 
Cross-sectional, Time-series Models 
Intra-EC trade .000283*** 
(5.26) 

Post-1969 dummy 4.62** 

(3.11) 
Trade *interaction -.00000554** 
(-3.44) 







Source: The source for the trade data is Eurostat (1995).The source for 
Article 177 references is data collected by the authors and the ECJ. 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients, with t-statis- 
tics reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is annual Article 
177 references for each member state, per year. The independent 
variables are intra-EC trade, or the value of both imports and exports for 
each member state (Belgium and Luxembourg combined) with all other 
member states, for each year; a dummy variable coded 0 from 1961-69 
and 1 from 1970-92;and an interaction variable, which is intra-EC trade 
multiplied by year. The model consists of 246 observations: Belgium- 
Luxembourg 1961-92;Denmark 1973-92;France 1961-92;Germany 
1961-92;Greece 1981-92;Ireland1973-92;Italy 1961-92;Netherlands 
1961-92;Portugal 1986-92; Spain 1986-92;and United Kingdom 
1973-92.Econometric Views 2.0was used to estimate a fixed effects 
model. See Stimson (1985)and Sayrs (1989)for a discussion of pooled 
models. 
**p < .Ol; ***p < ,001. 
the coefficient would be negative, indicating a declining 
effect of trade on Article 177 references over time. The 
coefficient for the interaction variable is indeed nega- 
tive and statistically significant. We believe that the 
growing articulation and differentiation of the Euro- 
rules that constitute the EC's normative structure will 
gradually generate more Article 177 references. 
In the next section, we examine more closely our 
contention that the operation of the EC legal system 
both provokes and reinforces the spillover effects that 
partly drive the construction of supranational gover- 
nance. 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND THE 
DYNAMICS OF SUPRANATIONAL 
GOVERNANCE 
We have argued that integration processes are generally 
driven by transnational activity, by efforts of suprana- 
tional institutions to reduce transaction costs, and by 
the positive feedback effects on transnational society of 
supranational judicial lawmaking and legislating. In 
this section, we cross-check our theory by, among other 
things, examining concrete policy outcomes in specific 
domains of EC law. We therefore shift the perspective 
from the broad relationships depicted in the statistical 
analysis to a more fine-grained examination of how, 
and to what effect, the legal system operates. Because 
our theory fundamentally conflicts with the dominant 
framework, intergovernmentalism, we begin by sum- 
marizing our differences. 
Intergovernmentalists argue that national executives 
are in control of every crucial step in the construction 
of the European polity. Employing a logic derived from 
two-level game imagery (Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam 
1993), Moravcsik (1993,1994), for example, claims that 
governments, acting in the Council of Ministers and in 
summit meetings, establish the parameters that deter- 
mine the content, scope, and pace of integration. 
Governments cooperate to achieve their policy goals 
and to enhance their autonomy in domestic politics. 
Due to the decision-making rules in place in most EC 
legislative processes (unanimity and super-majority 
voting), the Euro-rules produced reflect the prefer- 
ences of those governments which support the least 
amount of integration in any given area (the lowest 
common denominator). The behavior of private actors, 
subnational public authorities, and the EC's organs are 
secondary; they serve to "consolidate" new levels of 
integration (Moravcsik 1995). 
Intergovernmentalists also have sought to explain 
the operation of the legal system. Employing a logic 
derived from principal-agent theories of delegation 
(Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991), Garrett (1992) argues 
that the ECJ (the agent) serves the interests of the 
dominant members in the EC (the court's principals). 
The ECJ, intergovernmentalists claim, codifies the 
preferences of these states in its case law. It does so in 
order to avoid court-curbing measures and to secure 
compliance with its rulings. 
In contrast, we argue that governments do not 
control legal integration in any determinative sense 
and therefore cannot control European integration 
more broadly. We do not want to be misunderstood. 
The EC polity contains strong "intergovernmental" 
components, that is, EC politics are partly constituted 
by the interactions among representatives of the gov- 
ernments. But it is our contention that "intergovern- 
mentalism," when that term denotes the body of theory 
and causal propositions about European integration, is 
deeply flawed (see also Pierson 1996). In using the 
word intergovernmentalism, we need to distinguish the 
descriptive from the theoretical label. Moreover, any 
theory of European integration must notice and take 
account of the role of governments, clearly stating how 
that role is conceptualized. 
The Council of Ministers and representatives of the 
member states are important actors in European poli- 
tics. We understand their effect on integration to be 
positive when they (1) work with supranational institu- 
tions to adopt, at the supranational level, Euro-rules 
and (2) transpose, on the national level, European 
directives into national law. They have a negative 
influence on integration when they (1) block EC legis- 
lation (in their capacity as members of the council) and 
(2) refuse to comply with the Euro-rules they do not 
like (in their capacity as national governments). 
Generally, we expect governments to be more reac- 
tive than proactive within integration processes. Euro- 
pean integration facilitates not only transnational trade 
but also the construction of associations and social 
movements, and this exchange, as it rises, pressures 
governments to act in prointegrative ways. At any point 
in time, and in any particular area, governments can 
fail to respond to transnational interests, but (if levels 
of exchange are rising) only at ever-increasing costs. 
Thus, we expect that the pace of integration will vary 
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across issue areas, partly as a function of the relative 
intensity of transnational activity in a given area. And 
we expect the EC's legal system to serve the interests of 
transnational society, not individual governments, or 
even a consortium of powerful governments (the argu- 
ment is elaborated more fully in Stone Sweet and 
Sandholtz 1997). 
Empirically, our differences with intergovernmental- 
ists must begin with the challenge of explaining the 
constitutionalization of the treaty system. As we have 
tried to demonstrate, constitutionalization profoundly 
transformed the EC polity. As discussed above, the 
ECJ, activated by Article 177 references, constructed 
the EC legal system: It worked to diffuse the doctrines 
of supremacy and direct effect and to provide national 
judges with the means to enforce EC law, even against 
national governments and the legislatures that govern- 
ments control. Further, constitutionalization did not 
take place surreptitiously. During the proceedings that 
preceded the ECJ's announcements of supremacy and 
direct effect, various governments argued, in formal 
"observations"-briefs advising the court how it should 
decide-that the Treaty of Rome could not be inter- 
preted so as to support either doctrine (Burley and 
Mattli 1993, Stein 1981). Nevertheless, the court re- 
vised the treaty by authoritatively interpreting it, and 
these interpretations transformed the nature of EC 
governance. Governments agreed to this transforma- 
tion, but only after the fact and only tacitly, by progres- 
sively adjusting their behavior to the emergence of new 
rules. 
We view the ECJ, not unlike Weiler (1981, 1991, 
1994) and Burley and Mattli (1993), as generally 
working to enhance the autonomy of the EC legal 
system, autonomy that is then exercised to promote the 
interests of transnational society and to facilitate the 
construction of supranational governance. The court 
does not'work in the interests of member governments, 
except in the very loose sense in which those interests 
can be construed as being in conformity with the 
treaty's purposes broadly-not narrowly-conceived. 
The move to supremacy and direct effect must be 
understood as audacious acts of agency. The ECJ could 
afford to move aggressively to revise the treaty on its 
own, because its formal relationship with the member 
states is a permissive one. Given the decision-making 
rule in place (unanimity), the credibility of the threat 
that the member states would reverse constitutional- 
ization-or any ECJ treaty interpretation-was and 
remains low. 
We now examine the dynamics of integration in two 
very different areas: the free movement of goods and 
the Europeanization of social provisions. While we 
cannot claim a representative sample, the cases se- 
lected vary along a number of dimensions, several of 
which deserve emphasis. The free movement of goods 
domain constitutes negative integration, the removal of 
national rules that hinder transnational exchange. This 
domain is a core value of the EC polity and is the most 
highly developed of European law. The production of 
EC social provisions constitutespositive integration, the 
elaboration of supranational rules that replace (or fix 
standards for) national rules governing in a particular 
area. Such rules regulate exchange among individuals 
and between individuals and their government. Unlike 
negative integration processes, wherein the dominance 
of the ECJ and its case law is virtuallv total. the 
competence to make rules in the social area is shared 
by the court and the EC's legislative institutions (in- 
cluding the Council of Ministers, which generally has 
the last word). Since the late 1970s, the EC has 
produced five major directives on equal treatment and 
nondiscrimination between the sexes in the workplace 
and in benefits. In negative integration processes the 
potential for large collective gains from trade is obvi- 
ous; in positive integration processes, the efficiency 
logic of integration is greatly reduced. Given these and 
other important differences, to the extent that the EC 
legal system operates in invariant or similar ways, our 
claims are better supported or undermined. 
We begin with Article 177 references. Recall that 
most are triggered by litigants who claim that rules or 
practices in place in a member state are not in compli- 
ance with EC law and request, nevertheless, that a 
national judge enforce EC law. Activated by these 
references, the ECJ was able to construct the EC legal 
system by taking decisions that voided the application 
of national rules and practices in favor of Euro-rules. 
Thus, most rulings are rendered in the bright light of 
clearly revealed preferences on the part of a member 
state not to comply. This dynamic belies, on its face, 
intergovernmentalist assertions. And, as mentioned 
above, governments participate directly in Article 177 
processes by regularly filing with the court legal briefs 
defending the legality of their own (or any other 
national) rule or practice, and by indicating to the court 
how they believe the dispute ought to be decided. Thus, 
in advance of any important decision, the ECJ is 
normally well informed of governmental preferences. 
Congruent with our theory, we expect Article 177 
litigation to be patterned in predictable ways. In stating 
these expectations as testable propositions, we further 
clarify our differences with intergovernmentalists. First, 
other things being equal, references will target dispro- 
portionately those national barriers to transnational 
activity that hinder access to larger markets relative to 
smaller markets. The hypothesis can be tested by 
examining the effect of litigation on negative integra- 
tion. that is. the removal of barriers to trade and other 
acti;ity. second, other things being equal, references 
will target disproportionately those national rules and 
practices that operate to downgrade the effect and 
application of European secondary rules. The legal 
system will then operate to push the lowest common 
denominator upward, in a progressive and prointegra- 
tive direction, nullifying the lawmaking effects of una- 
nimity voting in the council. The hypothesis can be 
tested by examining the effect of litigation on positive 
integration via the production of harmonized Euro- 
pean rules and their transposition into national legal 
regimes. Our general claim is, therefore, that the EC 
legal system works to dismantle barriers to transna- 
tional activity in place in the dominant member states 
and to ratchet Euro-rules upward from the lowest 
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TABLE 5. Article 177 References Regarding Free Movement of Goods and Social Provisions: 
Percentage Difference, Actual Number, and Proportional Share 
Free Movement of Goods 
Member Percentage Actual Proportional Percentage 
State Difference Number Share Difference 
Austria -.05 0 .4 .55 
Belgium -4.89 42 74.8 .22 
Denmark -.57 10 13.8 6.92 
France .23 116 114.3 -12.90 
Germany 9.32 265 202.3 -6.28 
Greece -.73 3 7.9 -.58 
Ireland -.38 5 7.5 1.87 
Italy -.82 84 89.4 -7.97 
Luxembourg -.30 5 8.8 -.45 
Netherlands -1.43 86 95.5 2.50 
Portugal .51 7 3.6 -.54 
Spain .27 11 9.2 -.77 
Sweden . I9 2 .7 -.I1 
UK -1.34 34 42.9 17.54 


















Note: The first column indicates the positive or negative extent to which litigants are attacking the rules of a particular member state in a particular legal 
domain relative to other member states and other areas. The second column indicates the number of Article 177 references in that legal domain in each 
member state. The third column indicates the number of references each member state wouldhave registered if there were no difference between overall 
litigation rates for each member state and rates of litigation for each member state in each policy area. For instance, France accounts for slightly less than 
17.1% of all references. Thus, France's proportional share of free movement of goods references is 17.1 % of the 670 total references in that category, 
or 114.3. In other words, the proportional share entries are from the table of no association (the basis for the chi-squared test). French courts actually 
made 116 references in this same legal domain. Therefore, the percentage difference for France is calculated as follows: (1 16 - 114.3)/670. Entries may 
differ slightly due to rounding. 
common denominator. If we are right, another propo- 
sition follows logically: State preferences will not have 
a significant effect on judicial outcomes. These claims 
and predictions conflict, fundamentally, with intergov- 
ernmentalist expectations. 
Table 5 depicts cross-national patterns of litigation 
in the legal domains of free movement of goods and 
social provisions (more complete material is contained 
in Table A-1). The "percentage difference" column 
provides us with a rough benchmark for evaluating 
these patterns. The "actual number" column indicates 
the total number of Article 177 references registered in 
each of the member states, per legal domain. The 
"proportional share" column indicates the number of 
references each state would have generated if there 
were no difference between overall litigation rates and 
rates of litigation in specific legal areas. Thus, if a state 
accounted for 12% of total references, we assigned a 
proportional share of 12% of the references in each 
domain to that state (in other words, they are entries 
from the table of no association, the basis of the 
chi-squared test). We then subtracted, for each cate- 
gory and for each state, the predicted number of 
references from the actual number of references and 
standardized the difference by percentage. Thus, the 
percentage differences have positive and negative 
signs. A high positive value indicates that litigants are 
attacking the rules of a particular country in a partic- 
ular legal domain relative to other countries and other 
areas. A negative value indicates that a country is not 
being dragged to the ECJ as often as we might expect 
based on overall litigation rates relative to other mem- 
ber states and policy areas. 
Note that in the free movement of goods domain, 
accusations of German noncompliance dominate EC 
litigation. Of 670 references concerning that domain, 
265 (40%) target German laws. This does not mean 
that Germany has been more protectionist than every 
other EC member. It does mean that the German 
market, the largest in the EC, is the prize of free 
traders. Furthermore, it means that the matrix of 
trade-relevant rules in place in Germany has provided 
the predominant context for the ECJ's construction of 
an integrative case law. 
Confidence in our theory is further strengthened by 
empirical studies of outcomes. Kilroy (1996), in her 
analysis of free trade cases, assessed the relationship 
between observations-the briefs filed by the Euro- 
pean Commission and governments in pending cases- 
and the ECJ's rulings. She found that in 81 decisions 
(two-thirds of her pool), the court struck down national 
rules as treaty violations; in 41 cases (one-third of her 
pool), the court upheld national rules as permissible 
under EC law. She further found that in 98 of 114 cases 
in which the commission intervened, the court sided 
with the commission. The commission's position there- 
fore predicted the ECJ's decision 86% of the time. The 
position of governments utterly failed to predict the 
court's rulings; German interventions were found to be 
particularly ineffectual in generating outcomes. Follow- 
ing the logic of Garrett (1992), Kilroy (1996, 23) finds 
it "surprising that Germany has a relatively lower 
impact on the Court." But we do not. The EC7s 
supranational institutions-especially the commission 
and the court-operate to facilitate transnational ac- 
tivity, not to codify or give legal comfort to the 
preferences of the dominant states. 
These numbers tell only part of the story. As impor- 
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tant has been the positive feedback effect of ECJ 
decisions on integration processes. The free trade case 
law, initiated in 1974 with Dassonville (ECJ 1974b), 
sustained the integration project at a time when the 
legislative process was stalled by disputes among gov- 
ernments and between the Council of Ministers and 
the commission (Gormley 1985, Oliver 1988). Out of 
this case law came the famous principle of mutual 
recognition of national standards, which the ECJ used 
to help construct the common market. In developing 
this principle, the court demonstrated how member 
states might retain their own national rules, capable of 
being applied to the production and sale of domestic 
goods within the domestic market, while prohibiting 
members from applying these same rules to goods 
originating elsewhere in the community. The ECJ's 
case law also placed national regulations in "the 
shadow of the law," raising the specter of relentless 
litigation against rules that do not comply with the 
dictates of mutual recognition. 
Simplifying a complex chain of events, the adjudica- 
tion of disputes over free movement of goods between 
traders and member states triggered a political process 
by which the commission, in alliance with transnational 
business coalitions, converted mutual recognition into 
a general strategy that could be extended beyond free 
movement. That strategy ultimately resulted in the 
1986 Single European Act. The literature on the act 
has sufficiently demonstrated that governments did not 
meaningfully control this process (Alter and Meunier- 
Aitshalia 1994, Dehousse 1994, Sandholtz and Zysman 
1989). Instead, governments were forced to adapt to it. 
Governments did act, of course, in negotiating a treaty 
that codified prointegration solutions to collective ac- 
tion problems (Moravcsik 1991), including the princi- 
ple of mutual recognition. But most of these solutions 
had already emerged out of the structured interactions 
among transnational actors, the ECJ, and the commis- 
sion. 
We turn now to social provisions, the cluster of 
treaty rules and directives governing nondiscrimination 
on the basis of sex in pay and employment benefits. 
Table 5 shows that litigation originating in the British 
judiciary has driven the ECJ's docket in this area. Fully 
24% (401167) of all references in this domain have 
attacked, as inconsistent with EC law, legal rules and 
administrative practices in the United Kingdom. It is 
well known that the British government has constituted 
the crucial veto point in legislative deliberations within 
the Council of Ministers on social provisions (Pillinger 
1992, 85-101). Indeed, since the first directive was 
adopted by the Council of Ministers in 1975, the British 
government has not wavered in its intention, publicly 
declared, to veto any European proposal that would 
enshrine in EC law any rules not already enacted by 
Parliament (Kenney 1992). The data show that, in this 
sector, litigation has disproportionately attacked the 
national rules and practices that represented the lowest 
common denominator position on EC secondary legis- 
lation adopted by the council. 
We then tested our predictions concerning outcomes 
and the effect of observations made by the commission 
and the governments in all Article 177 references to 
the ECJ in the social provisions area, from 1970 (the 
date of the first reference in this domain) through 1992. 
Rulings were coded into one of two categories: either 
the court accepted a national rule or practice as 
consistent with EC law or declared it to be in violation. 
Of the 91 judgments that could be unambiguously 
coded,lZ the ECJ declared violation of EC law in 48, a 
success rate of 53% for plaintiffs in national courts. The 
ECJ considered the lawfulness of British practices in 24 
rulings, declaring violations in 13. Aggregating results 
from litigation involving the big three-France, Ger-
many, and the United Kingdom-the court ruled vio- 
lations in 24 of 41 decisions (59%). We also found, as 
Kilroy had in the free movement area, that the com- 
mission's briefs tracked results far better than did the 
observations filed by governments. The commission's 
success rate is a whopping 88%: 73 of its 83 observa- 
tions predict the direction of the final ruling. The 
United Kingdom's rate of success was 58% (31 of 54 
observations tracked final results). This challenges the 
intergovernmentalist assertion that the preferences of 
the most powerful states systematically constrain the 
ECJ. 
The effect of the ECJ's case law on national and 
supranational policy processes and outcomes in the 
social domain has been deep and pervasive. A large 
body of scholarship (e.g., Ellis 1991; Harvey 1990; 
Kenney 1994, 1996; Pierson 1996; Pillinger 1992; Pre- 
chal and Burrows 1990) has documented the extraor- 
dinary extent to which the ECJ has used its powers for 
creative interpretation of EC secondary legislation, like 
directives, and to ratchet up the lowest common de- 
nominator position in the Council of Ministers. Kenney 
(1992, chapter 3), who has examined the relationship 
between EC and British sex discrimination law in great 
detail, shows that by the mid-1980s "the EC [had] 
eclipsed the British parliament as the arena of innova- 
tion" in this respect. Tory governments have been 
forced by national court decisions to ask Parliament, 
on successive occasions over the past fifteen years, to 
amend British statutes to conform to the ECJ's evolv- 
ing case law.13 In this area, at least, lowest common 
denominator bargains struck in the council of Ministers 
have not stuck. Instead, the court has more or less 
systematically ratcheted obligations upward, in a 
prointegration direction. 
Finally, we examined the relationship between this 
case law and the work of the Council of Ministers. We 
found that the ECJ has used Article 177 references to 
We were forced to exclude data from ECJ judgments rendered in 
1993 (14 cases); as of June 1997, the European Court Reports for 
that year were unavailable, having been recalled to correct for errors. 
l 3  Relative to other European judiciaries, one would expect the 
British courts to enforce EC law only with great difficulty. The 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty formally prohibits judicial 
review of legislation, on any grounds, and doctrines governing the 
resolution of conflicts between treaty law and parliamentary statutes 
conflict with the ECJ's doctrine of supremacy. Both of these long- 
lived orthodoxies have been swept aside, in areas governed by EC 
law, as the British judiciary has incorporated as national law the 
doctrines of supremacy, direct effect, and indirect effect (Craig 1991, 
Levitsky 1994). 
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legislate, by judicial fiat, provisions vetoed in the 
council. In a wave of cases decided in 1990 and 1991, 
the ECJ boldly usurped the council's legislative pri- 
macy by enacting (as a matter of treaty interpretation) 
the substance of provisions contained in three different 
legislative proposals.14 Each of these proposals had 
been drafted by the commission, either to extend 
nondiscrimination provisions to new areas or to en- 
hance the enforceability of Euro-rules on equal treat- 
ment in the national courts. And each had been vetoed 
by the United Kingdom, among other governments, in 
the council. 
Thus, outcomes in both of the legal domains exam- 
ined are broadly consistent with predictions derived 
from our theory, but they are inconsistent with inter- 
governmentalist expectations. Although our analysis 
does not constitute a definitive test, we are confident 
that our theory outperforms intergovernmentalist the- 
ories more generally.15 Again, we have not argued that 
member state governments are irrelevant. It is our" 
contention, however, that they do not meaningfully 
control integration processes. Existing intergovern- 
mentalist theories of integration may well help us 
understand the bargaining processes in the Council of 
Ministers and in European summits. But this bargain- 
ing takes place within contexts constructed by pro- 
cesses explained by our theory. 
In summary, we believe that the EC legal system 
operates according to a generalizeable dynamic. Indi- 
viduals ask national judges to void national rules or 
practices in favor of EC legal rules within a particular 
domain of activity. Transnational dispute resolution- 
the interaction among litigants, national courts, and 
the ECJ-recasts the law governing that domain of 
activity and, therefore, the policymaking environment. 
As new rules are and existing rules are 
reinterpreted, national governments (in whose terri- 
tory rules or practices are now out of step with EC 
rules) are placed in an ever longer and darker "shadow 
of the law." The court's case law ~rovides the commis- 
sion with the constitutional backkg for its own policy- 
making goals, to the extent that these goals are them- 
l4 The court enacted: (1) in Barber (ECJ 1990b), abrogations of those 
provisions of the Equal Treatment (1976) and Social Security (1979) 
directives that had permitted member states to derogate from 
principles of equal treatment in retirement pensions; (2) in Dekker 
(ECJ 1991b), the main provisions of the "pregnancy directive," which 
were designed to protect pregnant women from discrimination; and 
(3) in Hertz (ECJ 1991c), the core elements of the proposed "burden 
of proof' directive, which was designed to shift the burden to the 
member states in cases involving sex discrimination. 
l5 Intergovernmentalists tend to conceptualize the activities of the 
ECJ in terms given by game theory or principal-agent theory. In this 
imagery, the Eurolaw "game" is dyadic, played by member states (or 
principals) in one seat and the ECJ (the agent) in another (e.g., 
Garrett 1992, Kilroy 1996). Such analyses all but ignore two sets of 
actors-private litigants and national judges-who are crucial to how 
the legal system functions. Moravcsik (1993, 513) openly admits that 
his intergovernmentalism cannot explain the construction of the legal 
system (but see also Moravcsik 1995). It is our contention that the 
operation of the legal system-highly structured interactions among 
private litigants, national judges, and the ECJ-is at the very core of 
European integration processes writ large. Political scientists cannot 
begin to explain the dynamics of European integration without a 
coherent account of legal integration. 
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selves integrative. And this case law enhances the 
capacity of individuals to initiate future litigation, by 
providing potential litigants with more precise infor- 
mation about the content and scope of European law. 
Thus, in process tracing, we see again the self-sustain- 
ing dynamic that we theorized and then found in the 
quantitative analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
We have proposed a theory of how a transnational 
rule-of-law polity may emerge. This emergence, the 
theory implies, depends critically on the construction 
of causal linkages among three factors: exchange, 
triadic dispute resolution, and the production of legal 
rules. We derived a set of propositions from the theory 
and tested them in the case of the European Commu- 
nity. We then cross-checked our quantitative results by 
process-tracing in two discrete areas of EC law. We 
found broad support for the general theory and for 
specific claims about how the EC legal system operates. 
We emphasized the transformative effect of the 
ECJ's early case law, which "constitutionalized" the 
treaty system. Relative to the EC as originally con- 
ceived by the member states (and relative to pure 
intergovernmental fora), constitutionalization made 
the EC far more responsive to the demands of trans- 
national society-those who exchange across borders. 
In the EC, individuals can activate transnational adju- 
dication processes on their own. In virtually all other 
international regimes, individuals must rely on inter- 
mediaries, usually representatives of governments, to 
press their claims and to pursue their other interests. 
But in the EC, the operation of the legal system has 
progressively reduced the capacity of national govern- 
ments to control policy outcomes, while it has en-
hanced the policy influence of the EC's supranational 
institutions, national judges, and private actors. 
We end by suggesting that our theory may help us 
understand the evolution of rule-of-law systems more 
generally. North (1990) has shown us that individual 
behavior, governmental organizations, and rules often 
evolve symbiotically, determining a great deal of what 
is most important about modern economic and politi- 
cal systems. North (1990, 35) has further argued that 
"impersonal exchange with third party enforcement . . . 
has been the critical underpinning" of successful mod- 
ernization and political development. Shapiro (1980) 
has demonstrated that courts are crucial to regime 
formation, state-building, and the consolidation of 
political legitimacy. Judges, because they are agents of 
normative (rule-oriented) change in rule-of-law societ- 
ies, possess the broad capacity to configure and recon- 
figure the polity. Certainly, they have done so in North 
America (e.g., Honvitz 1977; Russell, Knopff, and 
Morton 1989; Wolfe 1986), in Europe (e.g., Burley and 
Mattli 1993; Kommers 1989; Shapiro and Stone 1994; 
Stone 1992, 1994b; Weiler 1991), and in some interna- 
tional regimes (e.g., Hudec 1993, Stone Sweet 1997b). 
As we are now experiencing a "global expansion of 
judicial power" (Tate and Vallinder 1995), we have 
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APPENDIX A. Article 177 References: Actual Number, Proportional Share, gnd Percentage 
Difference by Legal Subject Matter 
A B C D E F G H I 
Austria -0.05% '-0.05% -0.05% -0.05% -0.05% 0.55% -0.05% -0.05% -0.05% 
Actual number 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Proportional 
share 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Belgium -4.89% -6.83% 1.79% -3.22% 17.56% 0.22% -6.61 O h  5.91O h  11.47% 
Actual number 42 33 29 5 112 19 2 28 31 
Proportional 
share 74.8 85.1 25.0 7.0 43.5 18.4 4.9 18.3 15.3 
Denmark -0.57% -0.10% 0.17% -2.07% -1.81 % 6.92% 0.21% -1.46% -2.07% 
Actual number 10 15 5 0 1 15 1 1 0 
Proportional 
share 13.8 15.7 4.6 1.3 8.0 3.4 0.9 3.4 2.8 
France 0.23% -3.72% 13.72% -1.21O h  -4.01 O h  -12.90% 5.64% 0.60% -5.41 % 
Actual number 1 16 102 69 10 5 1 7 10 29 16 
Proportional 
share 114.3 130.0 38.2 10.7 66.4 28.5 7.5 27.9 23.3 
Germany 9.32% 13.54% -1 1.03% 15.80% -5.62% -6.28% -27.96% -14.99% 0.43% 
Actual number 265 334 43 29 96 40 1 25 42 
Proportional 
share 202.3 230.0 67.5 18.9 1 17.6 50.3 13.3 49.4 41.3 
Greece -0.73% -0.26% -0.29% -1.18% -0.67% -0.58% -1.18% 3.70% -0.45% 
Actual number 3 7 2 0 2 1 0 8 1 
Proportional 
share 7.9 8.9 2.6 0.8 4.6 2.0 0.5 1.9 1.6 
Ireland -0.38% 1.23% 0.66% -1.13% -0.61 % 1.87% -1.13% 0.09% -0.40% 
Actual number 5 18 4 0 2 5 0 2 1 
Proportional 
share 7.5 8.6 2.5 0.7 4.4 1.9 0.5 1.8 1.5 
Italy -0.82% 1.71O h  2.27% -0.66% -1 1.82% -7.97% 32.10% 1.89% -6.06% 
Actual number 84 115 35 8 6 9 20 25 10 
Proportional 
share 89.4 101.6 29.9 8.4 51.9 22.2 5.9 21.8 18.3 
Luxembourg -0.30% -0.39% -0.60% -1.05% -0.28% -0.45% -1.05% 1.39% 1.87% 
Actual number 5 5 1 0 3 1 0 4 4 
Proportional 
share 8.8 10.0 2.9 0.8 5.1 2.2 0.6 2.2 1.8 
Netherlands -1.43% -2.34% -4.45% 0.02% 5.73% 2.50% 1.64% -2.08% -3.32% 
Actual number 86 9 1 22 9 78 28 7 20 15 
Proportional 
share 95.5 108.6 31.9 8.9 55.5 23.8 6.3 23.3 19.5 
Portugal 0.51% -0.54 1.25 -0.54 -0.28 -0.54 -0.54 0.07% -0.54% 
Actual number 7 0 4 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Proportional 
share 3.6 4.1 1.2 0.3 2.1 0.9 0.2 0.9 0.7 
Spain 0.27% -1.11 1.31 -1.37 -0.09 -0.77 -1.37 4.73% -0.64% 
Actual number 11 2 6 0 5 1 0 10 1 
Proportional 
share 9.2 10.4 3.1 0.9 5.3 2.3 0.6 2.2 1.9 
Sweden 0.19% -0.11% -0.1 1% -0.11% -0.1 I% -0.11% -0.11 % 0.50% -0.11% 
Actual number 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Proportional 
share 0.7 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 
United Kingdom -1.34% -1.04% -4.63% -3.24% 2.05% 17.54% 0.41O h  -0.31 % 5.27% 
Actual number 34 41 4 2 33 40 3 10 16 
Proportional 
share 42.9 48.8 14.3 4.0 24.9 10.7 2.8 10.5 8.8 
Note: A = free movement of goods; B = agriculture; C = competition and dumping; D = external policy; E = social security; F = social provisions; G = 
environment; H = establishment; I = free movement of workers; J = taxes; K = transportation; L = common policy; M = approximation of laws; N = 
other. Actual number indicates the number of Article 177references in that legal domain for each member state. Proportional share entries are the number 
of cases that each member state would have registered in each legal domain if there were no difference between overall litigation rates for each member 
state and rates of litigation for each member state in each policy area. Thus, if Germany accounts for 30% of the references overall, we assigned a 
proportional share of 30% of the references in each policy area to Germany. In other words proportional share is the "table of no association" (the basis 
of the chi-squared test). Bold entries are percentage differences, which are calculated the following way: (Actual number - Proportional share)/total 
number of references in the legal domain. These entries are indicative of the positive or negative extent to which litigants are attacking the rules of a 
particular member state in a particular domain relative to other member states and other areas. 
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APPENDIX A. (continued) 
J K L M N 
-0.05% 1.42% -0.05% -0.05% -0.05% 
0 1 0 0 0 
0.1 0.04 0.2 0.1 0.3 
-3.13% 7.96% -8.94% -0.52% -0.21 % 
20 13 1 15 66 
27.8 7.6 5.0 16.8 67.3 
4.36% 6.76% 0.16% 0.06% -1.57% 
16 6 1 3 3 
5.1 1.4 0.9 3.1 12.4 
-3.43% -5.32% -8.20% -0.07% 8.95% 
34 8 4 24 157 
42.4 11.6 7.7 25.7 102.7 
-0.91 % -2.29% 9.77% -9.66% -1 1.49% 
73 19 18 29 113 
75.1 20.5 13.6 45.5 181.8 
-0.38% -1.18% -1.18% -1.18% -1.80% 
2 0 0 0 18 
2.9 0.8 0.5 1.8 7.1 
-1.13% -1.13% 3.32% -1.13% -0.63% 
0 0 2 0 3 
2.8 0.8 0.5 1.7 6.8 
2.30% -7.48% 4.42% 10.05% 3.56% 
39 4 8 33 102 
33.2 9.1 6.0 20.1 80.3 
-0.64% 0.42% -1.05% 0.37% 0.94% 
1 1 0 2 12 
3.3 0.9 0.6 1.9 7.9 
3.00% -2.51% -0.94% 2.04% 1.65% 
43 8 6 23 96 
35.4 9.7 6.4 21.5 85.8 
0.67% 0.93% 1.69% 0.17% -0.37% 
3 1 1 1 1 
1.3 0.4 0.2 0.8 3.2 
-0.16% -1.37% -1.37% 1.47% -0.04% 
3 0 0 4 8 
3.4 0.9 0.6 2.1 8.2 
-0.11% -0.11% -0.11% -0.11% 0.06% 
0 0 0 0 1 
0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.7 
-0.39% 3.88% 2.48% -1.45% -2.60% 
15 7 4 7 23 
15.9 4.4 2.9 9.7 38.5 
Note: A-See preceeding page. 
every reason to theorize more rigorously the political 
effect of triadic dispute resolution. 
APPENDIX B 
\We tested whether higher levels of references per member 
state are generated, respectively, by (1) higher levels of 
diffuse support for the European legal system (measures 
developed by Caldeira and Gibson 1995), (2)  larger popula- 
tions (aggregated as the average population for each member 
state, 1961-93), and (3) larger economies (aggregated as the 
average GDP for each member state, 1961-93). The depen- 
dent variable for each model is the average number of Article 
177 references per member state, and n = 11. Our results are 
summarized as follows: 
Inter- Adj. 
cept t coefficient t R' SEE 
Diffuse 
support 10.08 3.92 19.88 1.18 .04 8.54 
Population 6.40 1.55 9.43 (lo-') 1.16 .03 8.55 
GDP 3.33 1.48 1.48 (lo-'') 4.30 .63 5.27 
The index of diffuse support for the ECJ is from Caldeira and 
Gibson (1995, 364). Population data are from the World 
Tables o f  Economic and Social Indicators (World Bank 
1990). GDP data for 1960-69 are from the Cross-National 
Time-Series Study Banks 1976); and GDP data for 1970-94 
are from the World Tables (World Bank 1995). 
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